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I should confess from the outset that I was very much a latecomer to the seminal article by 
the late Nils Christie on 'ideal victims', which is the article that forms the inspiration for the 
book under consideration in this review. The work concerned1 was first drawn to my 
attention by a colleague at Sheffield Hallam University2 in one of those very productive 
conversations you can have waiting for the photocopier to do its work (or not). In fact, full 
disclosure is required: not only are two colleagues of mine at Hallam contributors to this 
excellent edited volume of insightful chapters,3 but its editor, Marian Duggan, is also a 
former colleague and is another person who has developed my fledgling knowledge of 
critical victimology.4 
The book contains insightful chapters on the concept of the 'ideal victim' in relation to, for 
example: hate crime victims generally; Muslim women who wear the veil; LGB/T women; 
female sex worker victims; migrants; survivors of childhood sexual abuse; victims of 
domestic violence; elderly rape victims; online fraud victims; and male prisoners as victims.  
If I had to summarise the collective thrust of this book, it would be as follows: Too many 
victims of crime, and particularly too many female victims of sexual offending and crimes 
such as domestic abuse in its many forms, are treated as 'non-ideal' victims, and suffer a loss 
of dignity, respect, and any proper avenue to justice as a result.5 In sum, the non-ideal victim 
is in practice at great risk of being non-powerful. This is partly because, as Christie wrote, a 
"condition… for being an ideal victim, is thus that you are powerful enough to make your 
case known and successfully claim the status of an ideal victim".6 The alternative, Christie 
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concluded, is that a non-ideal victim may be "opposed by so strong counter-powers that you 
can not be heard".7 Doctrinal opposition from the courts as to the righteous nature of victims 
and victimhood where there have been failures to secure their safety, at least, is diminishing, 
in some ways. 
In the spring of 2018, a case brought by a pair of the victims of John Worboys (the 'Black 
Cab Rapist'), in a claim known as DSD, saw the Supreme Court determine that the victims of 
serious sexual offending were entitled to damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 where 
“egregious and significant” errors in police investigations entailed a failure to apprehend an 
offender in a specific case.8 Lord Kerr, writing in DSD, rejected the idea that failings in the 
investigation of offences committed by Worboys were “largely attributable to a flawed 
structural approach”; arguing instead that there were sufficiently serious failings at a local 
police level that the claimants should be afforded a remedy against the Metropolitan Police, 
in the form of damages, in this particular case. The Supreme Court observed that in the cases 
concerned there were failures to record information in reports of crimes; failures to promptly 
interview witnesses; failures to collect CCTV evidence (from a police station no less!); and 
failures to link complaints from multiples victims to one man.9  
The value of Duggan's work in bringing together 16 chapters from a range of contributors and 
perspectives is that this demonstrates to a largely black-letter legal audience (of which I am a 
member) that a single shift in the courts on a particular point of law, while important, will not 
be enough to recognise the challenges that victims of crime face, in the UK or elsewhere. The 
16 chapters in this text make a significant contribution between them to the discourse of 
critical victimology, and take the problematic criminological concept of 'ideal' victimhood as 
their collective touchstone. 
Many of the 16 chapters in the volume in turn address issues faced in the criminal justice 
system(s) concerned by ideal/non-ideal victims in particular groups or with particular 
identities. Sometimes the chapter authors address victimisation thematically. It might be that 
the authors had no choice in taking this approach, as statute law might shape and frame our 
analyses of the ideal/non-ideal status of victims. For example, Hannah Mason-Bish notes 
                                            
7 Ibid. 
8 Lord Kerr in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD and another [2018] UKSC 11 at 29. 
9 Ibid. at 51. 
 
feminists@law  Vol 8, No 2 (2018) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
3 
 
that: "'Hate crime' is the ultimate 'ideal victim' crime in that legislative approaches have 
specified very particular groups of victims as worthy of the enhanced protection that such 
laws afford."10 
But it is also often the case, in terms of group-labelling by the state, that possible victims may 
instead be potentially criminalised. As Catherine Donovan and Rebecca Barnes have 
concluded: 
…black and minority ethnic women and men, and lesbians and gay men have 
historically been constructed not only as unreliable witnesses [to their own 
victimisation],but also, especially those who are black or belong to other minority 
ethnic groups, as well as gay men, as potential criminals to be the subject of 
surveillance rather than as potential victims of crime.11 
On finishing my reading of this collection of chapters, with their combined, and impressive 
swathe and scope, I was left wondering if society would only pursue and harm more victims 
through (re)creating their identities; labelling them effectively, and in practice, as non-ideal. 
This process might occur even as we increasingly, in a scholarly sense, identify barriers to the 
'ideal' status for victims under our academic gaze. Perhaps the non-ideal victim is shamefully 
intrinsic to us, because of our tendency to stigmatise.12 Buried in the text, in the chapter by 
Alice Bosma, Eva Mulder and Antony Pemberton, is a point that any of the chapters in this 
excellent collection could have concluded on: "[I]s it the extent to which the victim is ideal 
that influences reactions to them, or do reactions to the victim establish to what extent they 
are ideal?"13  
I am conscious that I began this book review with an eye to the development of increased 
human rights protections for victims of serious sexual offences, as a particular shift in case 
law, but also something that is a progressive development for victims' rights: and I would still 
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explain it as such. However, there is then the issue of less-serious sexual and/or violent 
offences and their report and investigation through to prosecution. The UK courts have 
maintained (in a way that the DSD judgment does not preclude) that criminal offences are on 
a ‘sliding scale’ of seriousness in human rights terms – with some offending not warranting 
proper protection (in the sense of a strictest duty of investigation) under the absolute human 
rights across the panoply of those available under the European Convention on Human 
Rights. These include the comparatively inflexible Article 3 ECHR: the right not to be 
subject to inhuman or degrading treatment. Article 8 ECHR which entails the right to respect 
for private and family life, is inherently not so protective or so strict. 
Lavender J has mused whether "a case which fell within the scope of Article 8 could also be 
seen as part of [a] sliding scale, and that a case which fell within the scope of Article 8 but 
not Article 3 would fall further down the scale than a case which fell within the scope of 
Article 3".14 However, Lavender J also noted the "English courts have yet to consider the 
circumstances in which such a duty might arise under Article 8 on a case which does not also 
fall within the scope of Article 3".15 Gross LJ has concluded that "it would be necessary to 
think long and hard before acceding to any claim raising the prospect of some generalised 
positive obligation on the State to intervene under Art. 8, without the closest scrutiny of the 
limits of any such postulated obligation".16 Gross LJ surmised that the "ramifications 
otherwise could be most unfortunate – not least, the unhappy prospect of widening the scope 
of Art. 8 still further".17  
I confess, in conclusion, that this book has made me consider a different “unhappy prospect”. 
Currently, any legal discussion of victims' rights shows that there is still work for the black-
letter law to do in terms of encompassing the breadth of challenges facing victims whose 
experiences warrant dignified treatment, and whose reported crimes morally deserve 
investigation. The book under review, in its 16 chapters, highlights how this development of 
the law and practice might be best informed by scholarship in the field of critical 
victimology; and in particular, recommendations of the status of 'ideal/non-ideal' victims. 
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